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This research expands upon the current theoretical literature on the political econ-
omy of trade policy by empirically estimating the degree of rent-seeking in the presence
of free riding. The results provide strong evidence that the level of trade protection
awarded to industries is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by political factors, including the num-
ber of ﬁrms that actively participate in a collective action. However, fewer ﬁrms par-
ticipate in collective actions in industries characterized by either a large number of
ﬁrms or high concentration levels because the free rider problem becomes more severe.
I estimate a model of ﬁrm participation in antidumping petitions using a panel of U.S.
petition ﬁlings and outcomes between 1980 and 1996. After estimating the parameters
of the model, I simulate the impact of speciﬁc changes in U.S. antidumping law and
ﬁnd that even small changes in the private returns to participating in this rent-seeking
activity will dramatically change the level of trade protection in the economy.
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11 Introduction
All ﬁrms within an industry beneﬁt from trade protection but only those ﬁrms that
lobby for protection bear the costs. Thus, a ﬁrm deciding whether or not to lobby for trade
protection has the incentive to both free ride and rent-seek. The issue of these opposing
incentives has been addressed in the theoretical literature, but the diﬃculty of ﬁnding reliable
data has resulted in a relative paucity of empirical work on the issue. Although other authors
have studied the propensity to ﬁle for antidumping protection at the industry level, I provide
the ﬁrst direct estimation of the degree of free riding in this rent-seeking activity.1
Under Title VII of the Tariﬀ Act of 1930, ﬁrms can ﬁle a petition requesting that an-
tidumping tariﬀs be imposed on a speciﬁc product from a speciﬁc foreign country.2 The
petition may be ﬁled by one or more ﬁrms; each ﬁrm in the industry must decide individ-
ually whether or not to actively participate in the petition. The petitioning ﬁrms assert
that the product is being imported at less than “normal” or “fair” value and that these
imports are causing (or threaten to cause) injury to the domestic industry.3 If the petition is
approved, the government imposes an antidumping tariﬀ on the product. The petition may
fail to reach a ﬁnal government determination if the foreign and domestic industry negotiate
an “out-of-court” settlement agreement that beneﬁts both parties.4
1Research that studies an industry’s propensity to ﬁle antidumping petitions include Krupp [1994], Staiger
and Wolak [1994], Sabry [2000], Feinberg and Hirsch [1989] and Herander and Pupp [1991].
2A petition can also be ﬁled by workers in the domestic industry or initiated by the Department of
Commerce.
3“Normal” value is deﬁned as either the price in the foreign country or the average cost in the foreign
country. Thus, Title VII is intended to combat both predatory pricing and price discrimination. It should
be noted, however, that a growing body of literature challenges the government’s assertion that antidumping
laws combat unfair trade, suggesting that the decision to ﬁle an antidumping petition is purely a rent-seeking
activity. See, for example, Baldwin and Moore [1991].
4Between 1980 and 1996, approximately 20 percent of all antidumping petitions were either terminated
or suspended prior to the government reaching a ﬁnal determination. Suspended cases are those in which
the government negotiates an outcome with the foreign industry to increase its price or reduce its exports
in exchange for the petition being withdrawn. Terminated petitions are those that are withdrawn without
a government-sanctioned agreement. There is strong evidence that the foreign and domestic industry are
reaching an unoﬃcial agreement in the case of terminated petitions. Throughout the course of this research,
I treat both suspended and terminated petitions as those that are “settled.”
2In the model presented here the expected beneﬁts to each ﬁrm of ﬁling an antidumping
petition include both the change in proﬁts that result from the government imposing a tariﬀ
and those that result from the domestic industry reaching a settlement agreement with their
foreign competitors. Only those ﬁrms that participate in the petition pay the legal costs
associated with ﬁling the petition; therefore, ﬁrms are tempted to free ride oﬀ of other ﬁrms
in the industry. Firms choose to participate in the petition only because the expected amount
of protection increases as the number of ﬁrms participating increases.
I use Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) to estimate the parameters of the structural
model using a panel of U.S. antidumping petitions ﬁled between 1980 and 1996. Simulation
techniques allow for unobserved heterogeneity across industries and countries and address
data challenges that arise in the course of estimating the model. I use the structural model
to simulate the eﬀect of speciﬁc changes in antidumping law on the level of protection in the
United States.
I show that the level of trade protection awarded to industries is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
by political factors, including the number of ﬁrms that actively participate in a collective
action.5 However, fewer ﬁrms participate in collective actions in industries characterized by
either a large number of ﬁrms or high concentration levels because the free rider problem
becomes more severe. The results from the model also characterize which industries are more
likely to reach a settlement agreement with their foreign competitors following the initiation
of an antidumping petition.6 Counterfactual experiments oﬀer strong evidence that changing
ﬁrm incentives to participate in rent-seeking activities even slightly will dramatically alter
the level of trade protection in an economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the economic model.
Section 3 provides a brief description of the data. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the estimation
procedure and results respectively. Section 6 concludes.
5Although many authors have tested for the eﬀect of political inﬂuence on the pattern of antidumping
protection, the results have been inconclusive. See, for example, Hansen and Prusa [1997] and Finger, Hall
and Nelson [1982].
6Although Staiger and Wolak [1994] compare the returns to a settled petition versus one which reaches
a ﬁnal government determination, this is the ﬁrst empirical research that studies which industries are more
likely to reach a settlement agreement with their foreign competitors.
32 The Model
In this section, I present a model of ﬁrm participation in an antidumping petition in
which the ﬁrm weighs the costs with the private beneﬁts.
At the beginning of every period, each industry realizes Ω opportunities to ﬁle for an-
tidumping protection against an individual country. The number of opportunities depends on
the pricing decisions of foreign ﬁrms. When an opportunity presents itself, each ﬁrm within
the industry must decide whether it wants to participate in the antidumping petition.
Petitions have three possible outcomes. The domestic industry may reach a settlement
with the foreign industry prior to the government reaching a ﬁnal decision regarding the
case. In this case, the domestic industry withdraws its petition in exchange for a payoﬀ
from the foreign industry. If the foreign and domestic industry fail to reach a settlement
the petition enters the ﬁnal investigation stage. The government may make an aﬃrmative
decision about the petition and impose an antidumping tariﬀ of τ∗ on all imports of the
speciﬁc good from the targeted country. Alternatively, the government may make a negative
determination and dismiss the petition. The decision of the ﬁrm to ﬁle a petition depends on
the probabilities of each outcome, the payoﬀs associated with each outcome, and the costs
of ﬁling the petition. I discuss these factors in turn.
2.1 Beneﬁts from the Imposition of an Antidumping Tariﬀ
In each period, each ﬁrm within an industry observes the unconditional expected value
of the tariﬀ determination that would be made by the government if the petition is ﬁled.
Deﬁne a value τ as the sum of two terms, G and g(N). Here G is the impact on the govern-
ment’s decision of economic and political characteristics of the industry and country under
investigation and g(N) is a function of the proportion of ﬁrms that choose to participate
in the petition (N). A positive value of τ indicates an aﬃrmative determination by the
government in which a tariﬀ of τ is imposed, while a negative value of τ indicates a negative
determination by the government or a tariﬀ of 0. The unconditional expected value of the
tariﬀ (τ∗) is thus deﬁned as






τ, if τ ≥ 0
0,otherwise.
The expected value of the tariﬀ increases with the proportion of ﬁrms that participate in
the case because more ﬁrms can impose more political pressure on the government agencies
and, hence, force a higher level of protection.7
A successful antidumping petition results in an increase in proﬁts for all ﬁrms within
that industry. Prior to ﬁling, the expected change in proﬁts accruing to ﬁrm i when the




i (N) = α(N) + η + ξ
τ
i . (2)
The sum of the ﬁrst two terms, α and η, represent the average value to the industry of
the government imposing an unconditional expected tariﬀ of τ∗ on imports of the good in
question from the targeted country. The ﬁrst term, α, represents the portion of expected
beneﬁts that can be attributed to factors that are widely observed by both the domestic and
foreign industry, such as the size of the U.S. market and the expected tariﬀ determination.
Because α is a function of the expected tariﬀ, it increases with the number of ﬁrms that
choose to ﬁle for antidumping protection (N). The second term, η, represents the portion
of expected beneﬁts that is known only to ﬁrms within the domestic industry. This value is
unobserved by the foreign industry. The η term includes factors such as private information
the domestic industry has about potential growth in the market or future cost changes.
The ﬁnal term, ξτ
i , represents proﬁts speciﬁcally accruing to ﬁrm i when an expected
tariﬀ of τ∗ is imposed by the government. For example, if ﬁrm i produces a large portion
of the product targeted by the antidumping petition, then its expected beneﬁts from the
petition are higher than other ﬁrms within the same industry.
7The expected level of protection might increase with the number of participating ﬁrms for reasons other
than those associated with the political inﬂuence of the petitioning industry. Government agencies are
required to reject those petitions that do not have the support of at least 50 percent of the industry.
52.2 Beneﬁts from a Settlement Agreement
Both the foreign industry and the domestic industry would prefer a settlement agreement
to a tariﬀ. In a settlement agreement, the foreign industry makes a lump sum payment
to the domestic industry in exchange for the domestic industry dropping its antidumping
petition.8 The lump sum payment directly beneﬁts the domestic industry and allows the
foreign industry to avoid paying tariﬀ revenue to the U.S. government. In a world of perfect
information, both the foreign and domestic industry could predict the tariﬀ that would be
set by the government and calculate the transfer that maximizes the total net beneﬁts of the
agreement to both the foreign and domestic industry. In reality, the foreign and domestic
industry have private information about how a tariﬀ will impact their proﬁts, and this
asymmetric information inﬂuences the likelihood of reaching a settlement agreement and the
size of the settlement payment.9
To estimate the probability of reaching a settlement agreement and the expected beneﬁts
of such an agreement, consider a simple bargaining model in which the foreign industry
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the domestic industry of b η. The beneﬁts accruing to ﬁrm
i under a settlement agreement can be written as the sum of two terms:
B
S
i = b η + ξ
S
i . (3)
The ﬁrst term, b η, is the average value of the lump sum transfer from the foreign to the
domestic industry under the settlement agreement. The ﬁnal term, ξS
i , represents proﬁts
speciﬁcally accruing to ﬁrm i when an agreement is reached.
The foreign industry knows that the domestic industry will agree to any b η in which
the domestic industry’s average expected beneﬁts from the settlement agreement exceed
the average beneﬁts from proceeding to a ﬁnal government decision. In a world of perfect
8The foreign industry may agree to increase its price by a certain amount or reduce its level of exports
to the United States. The domestic industry is indiﬀerent between oﬀers of this nature and a cash transfer
from the foreign industry.
9The bargaining model included here is similar to those developed by Prusa [1992] and Panagariya
and Gupta [1998], which suggest that the foreign and domestic industry would always be better oﬀ under a
negotiated outcome rather than allowing an antidumping petition to reach a ﬁnal government determination.
Panagariya and Gupta [1998] show that any asymmetric information, such as diﬀerent beliefs about the
probability of a successful ﬁnal outcome, can reduce the likelihood of a negotiated outcome.
6information, the foreign industry could set b η such that α + η = b η, and an agreement always
would be reached. However, recall that only the domestic industry observes η, the second
component of beneﬁts that accrue to the domestic industry when a tariﬀ is imposed on foreign
imports. The foreign industry knows only that η has distribution F(η). When choosing b η,
the foreign industry must consider the eﬀect of b η on both its proﬁts and the probability of
reaching a successful settlement agreement. The foreign industry chooses b η by maximizing
its expected change in proﬁts due to the antidumping petition.
When making an oﬀer, the foreign industry calculates the probability of reaching a suc-
cessful settlement agreement, π∗, as the probability that the average beneﬁts to the domestic
industry from the settlement agreement are greater than those when the case reaches a ﬁnal
government decision, or Pr(b η ≥ α + η). Using the distribution of η, this probability can
alternatively be expressed as:
π
∗(b η) = F(b η − α). (4)
Note that the probability of reaching an agreement is increasing in the value of the settlement
oﬀer made by the foreign industry.
Deﬁne Bτ∗ as the foreign industry’s expected change in proﬁts that results from the
antidumping petition reaching a ﬁnal government decision, and BS∗ as the foreign industry’s
expected change in proﬁts that results from reaching a successful settlement agreement with






∗ − b η. (6)
In these equations, α∗ denotes the change in foreign industry proﬁts when an expected an-
tidumping duty of τ∗ is imposed upon its imports. The η∗ term represents beneﬁts accruing
to the foreign industry when the case is settled which are unobserved by the domestic in-
dustry. For example, the foreign industry undoubtedly has better information about how
its pricing decisions would change if a tariﬀ is imposed. The domestic industry knows only
that η∗ has distribution F ∗(η∗).
The foreign industry chooses b η by maximizing the expected change in proﬁts that occurs
due to the petition, U∗, which consists of the probability of reaching a settlement agreement
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∗(b η) = 0. (8)
Once a settlement oﬀer is made, the domestic industry knows with certainty whether
or not the case will be successfully settled. However, when making the decision to ﬁle for
antidumping protection, each ﬁrm in the domestic industry must estimate the probability
of reaching an agreement and the expected beneﬁts conditional on reaching a successful
agreement. Because the domestic industry does not observe η∗, the probability of reaching a
settlement agreement is calculated using the probability of getting a satisfactory oﬀer based
on the distribution of η∗. Once again, the probability of reaching a successful settlement
agreement is the probability that the average beneﬁts to the domestic industry of settling
are greater than forcing the petition to a ﬁnal government decision. This is the probability
that the settlement proposal, which is a function of η∗, is greater than some threshold value,
or:
π(N) = Pr[b η(η
∗) ≥ α(N) + η]. (9)
The foreign industry’s oﬀer b η, which is implicitly determined by Equation [8], is a monoton-
ically increasing function of η∗, therefore Equation [9] is equivalent to the probability that
η∗ is above a threshold value η such that the foreign ﬁrm’s settlement oﬀer is accepted by
the domestic industry.10
2.3 The Firm’s Decision to Participate
Given the payoﬀs and probabilities described above, the expected rewards to ﬁrm i when
an antidumping petition is ﬁled are deﬁned by:
Ui(N) = π(N)B
S
i + [1 − π(N)]B
τ
i (N). (10)
10More speciﬁcally, b η is a monotonically increasing function of η∗ as long as the foreign industry’s second
order condition holds. A suﬃcient condition for this to be true is that both the foreign industry and the
average domestic industry prefer to settle the case than continue on to a ﬁnal government decision given the
oﬀer b η.
8A petition is ﬁled if at least one ﬁrm in the industry decides to participate actively in the
petition. All ﬁrms in the industry beneﬁt from the imposition of a tariﬀ in the case of a
successful antidumping petition or a transfer from the foreign industry in case of a settlement
agreement, but only those ﬁrms that participate in the petition process must contribute to
the signiﬁcant costs. Costs of ﬁling a petition are primarily ﬁxed, and include payments
to lawyers, economists, and other consultants to prepare petitions that can be hundreds
of pages, testimony to present before government agencies, and responses to comments of
opponents of the petition. I allow the costs of participating, Ci, to consist of two terms. The
ﬁrst term, κ(N), represents the average cost of participating in the petition. This value is
decreasing in the number of ﬁrms that decide to contribute because the high ﬁxed costs are
divided amongst a larger group of ﬁrms. The second term, ξC
i , allows contributions to vary
across ﬁrms.11
The high cost of actively participating in the petition may encourage some ﬁrms to free
ride on others willing to bear these costs. However, as noted above, the expected level of
protection awarded due to the petition increases with the number of ﬁrms participating
in the case, N, because the industry can apply greater political pressure on government
agencies. Therefore each ﬁrm must compare its private beneﬁts, or the increase in the
expected beneﬁts of the petition that would arise if it joined the case, to the per ﬁrm costs
when deciding whether or not to contribute to the antidumping petition. Approximating the
increase in the expected beneﬁts when an additional ﬁrm joins the petition as the marginal





i + (1 − π(N))B
τ
i (N)] − Ci(N). (11)
Each ﬁrm has a strategy, Ai, denoted by (0,1), where “0” represents no contribution to
the antidumping petition and “1” represents contribution to the case. The strategy vector
for the game, A, is an (Ix1) binary vector, where I is the number of ﬁrms in the industry. A
pure strategy equilibrium occurs when holding the choices of all other ﬁrms ﬁxed, all ﬁrms
choosing to participate have positive expected net beneﬁts of participating and those that do
11For example, ξC
i allows larger ﬁrms or those with in-house counsel to pick up a larger share of costs. It
also allows ﬁrms to recruit additional ﬁrms to participate in the petition at no cost in order to increase the
level of protection.
9not participate would realize negative expected net beneﬁts. Deﬁning N∗ as the equilibrium
















To assure the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, I make the assumption that
the expected net beneﬁts of participating, A∗
i(N), are increasing in the number of ﬁrms
participating in the petition.12
One of the problems with equilibrium models of this nature is that there may be multiple
Nash equilibria, speciﬁcally due to tipping behavior. For example, if the costs of ﬁling a
petition are extremely high then there may exist one equilibrium in which nobody chooses
to participate in the petition and a second equilibrium in which multiple ﬁrms in the in-
dustry choose to participate and split the costs of the petition. However, there is a unique
equilibrium that Pareto dominates all other equilibria. Intuitively, because the returns to
the petition are increasing in the total number of ﬁrms participating, all ﬁrms beneﬁt when
more ﬁrms choose to join the petition.
3 Data
I compiled data on 157 countries and 447 four-digit 1987-SIC industries in the man-
ufacturing sector for the years 1980 through 1996. These years were chosen to avoid dis-
continuities that could result from the major change in the administration of antidumping
law in 1980 and the change from the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation System to the North
American Industry Classiﬁcation System in 1997. Sources include U.S. Bureau of the Census
surveys, including the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and Economic Census, as well as the
12Other models that have similar characteristics include Berry’s [1992] model of entry and Gowrisankaran
and Stavins’ [1999] model of network externalities. These models also need to make assumptions about the
monotonicity of beneﬁts or proﬁts in order to ensure a Nash equilibria.
10NBER’s U.S. Import and Export Data and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Variables include the value of domestic shipments, imports and exports, costs of production,
and measures of industry concentration. To avoid selection bias, it is important to include
all U.S. trading partners and industries within the manufacturing sector in the estimation
of the model.13
I merged the resulting panel with antidumping petition information. The U.S. Antidump-
ing Database includes information such as the date of initiation and outcome of petitions
ﬁled between 1980 and 1994. I supplemented this database with the information from Fed-
eral Register Notices associated with petitions ﬁled in 1995 and 1996. I collected the data
on the proportion of ﬁrms ﬁling the antidumping petitions for the entire sample period from
Federal Register notices and International Trade Commission reports.
Between 1980 and 1996, U.S. industries ﬁled a total of 795 antidumping petitions. Ap-
proximately 20 percent of the cases ﬁled during the sample period were settled prior to
reaching a ﬁnal government determination. Of the remaining cases, the government made
aﬃrmative decisions in slightly over half of the remaining cases. The average antidumping
tariﬀ imposed during the period was 49.4 percent. The average number of ﬁrms participating
in a particular petition was 33, although the majority of petitions were ﬁled by one to ﬁve
companies. This translates to an average participation rate of approximately one-third of
the ﬁrms in an industry.
Sixty-eight countries had at least one case ﬁled against them between 1980 and 1996.
However, over 60 percent of all antidumping petitions were ﬁled against the top ten targets
of antidumping petitions, including Japan, China, Germany, Taiwan, Korea, and Brazil.
Not surprisingly, the leading targets also rank as the United States’ most important trading
partners during the period and are primarily highly industrialized countries. The average
dumping margin imposed upon these countries varies considerably; for example, the average
13The country-speciﬁc data contained approximately 500 missing values. I used the simulation technique
developed in Lavy, Palumbo and Stern [1998] to estimate the missing values. The Economic Census is
released every ﬁve years (in 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997). Therefore, the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio and
total number of ﬁrms in the industry were imputed for non-Census years. A complete description of the
dataset is available from the author upon request.
11antidumping duty imposed upon China is nearly twice that of other countries.14
Of the 450 domestic industries, 121 ﬁled at least one antidumping petition during the
sample period. Most antidumping petitions, however, are ﬁled by a small group of extremely
price-sensitive industries. The steel works industry ﬁled by far the most petitions at 197,
followed by the steel pipe and tube industry and the ball bearings industry. Most of the
antidumping petitions ﬁled between 1980 and 1996 were against intermediate products rather
than consumer goods. The annual number of petitions ﬁled by an industry against a speciﬁc
country ranged from zero to ten.
4 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Estimation
This section ﬁrst discusses the empirical speciﬁcation, and then outlines the estimation
strategy. Simulation techniques used to overcome unique problems in the course of estimation
are described in Section 4.3.
4.1 Speciﬁcation
Recall that at the beginning of every period, each industry realizes a ﬁxed number
of opportunities to ﬁle for antidumping protection against country k. Deﬁne Ωkjt as the
number of opportunities industry j has to ﬁle for antidumping protection against country k
in period t. Let λkjt denote the rate at which these opportunities arise. I assume that the
distribution of Ωkjt given λkjt is Poisson with parameter λkjt, where lnλkjt = XFktβF +lnζkj.
Here, XFkt includes characteristics about country k in period t that may eﬀect the pricing
decisions of foreign ﬁrms. The term ζkj is a gamma-distributed error with parameter θ
associated with the unobserved factors about industry j in country k that may eﬀect the
rate of opportunities.
Under these assumptions, the unconditional distribution of Ωkjt can be written as a
negative binomial random variable. In other words, the probability of industry j realizing b o
14Critics of the antidumping regulations charge that dumping margins in cases involving non-market
economies such as China are inherently biased because in cost-based analysis the government uses costs in
a comparable third market rather than costs in the non-market economy itself.
12opportunities to ﬁle for antidumping protection against country k in period t can be written
as:
Pr(Ωkjt = b o) =
Γ(θ + b o)









The average beneﬁts associated with the government imposing an antidumping tariﬀ on
















Bkjt and XBkjt include industry characteristics that eﬀect the value of beneﬁts and
τ∗
kjt is the unconditional expected tariﬀ.15 Characteristics contained in X∗
Bkjt include such
variables as the value and growth of the industry’s exports to the United States and the
total size of the U.S. market. The domestic counterpart, XBkjt, includes these variables in
addition to others such as a proxy of the average markup by the domestic industry. One
would expect, for example, that the domestic industry’s beneﬁts, and the cost to the foreign
industry, would increase with the value of targeted imports. The parameter γ allows for the
possibility of diminishing marginal returns from the value of the dumping margin. Intuitively,
if the tariﬀ increases beyond a certain level, all imports from country k would be eliminated;
increasing the antidumping tariﬀ beyond this level would result in no additional beneﬁts to
the domestic industry.16
The expected antidumping tariﬀ imposed upon imports from country k, τ∗
kjt, depends
upon the decisions of government agencies. The domestic industry forms expectations about
this τ∗
kjt according to
Gkjt = XGkjtβG + ωkjt (15)
ωkjt ˜ iid N(µw,σ
2
w)
15The speciﬁcation for foreign beneﬁts was chosen to ensure that the foreign industry experiences a loss
when a tariﬀ is imposed, as suggested by theory.
16This general speciﬁcation could apply to a variety of market structures. For example, Herander and
Pupp [1991] use the small country and perfect competition assumption to derive the change in producer
surplus due to a tariﬀ as τREV (1 + 1
2ετ)(%IMP), where REV is the value of domestic sales, ε is the
elasticity of domestic supply, and %IMP is the percentage of total imports aﬀected by the government’s
decision.
13Variables in XGkjt include economic factors that government agencies are required to consider
under the antidumping statute when making their decisions, such as the change over the
period of investigation in domestic industry shipments and capacity utilization. Also included
in XGkjt are political factors that may inﬂuence government decisions, such as the total size
of the industry as measured by employment. The error term ωkjt captures inﬂuences on
government decisions that are unobserved.
To complete the speciﬁcation of the beneﬁts of ﬁling an antidumping petition, I assume
that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc beneﬁts and private-information terms used to determine the lump
















Assume that the average cost of participating in the petition, κ, is deﬁned by
κ = XCkjtβC + c(N) + νk. (16)
In this equation, XCkjt includes a constant that captures the average cost of ﬁling an an-
tidumping petition across industries. It also includes industry-speciﬁc variables such as the
number of ﬁrms in the industry and the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio. As the costs of par-
ticipating increase, the free rider problem becomes more severe and fewer ﬁrms choose to ﬁle
antidumping petitions. The parameter estimates associated with the costs of participating,
therefore, reveal the characteristics of those industries more prone to the free rider problem.
The term c(N) is a function of the number of ﬁrms actively participating in the case. The
random variable vk allow costs to vary by country. For example, it may be less expensive to
collect information about production in a country with a low-cost of living or more stringent
tax regulations. This random variable and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc portion of costs are distributed
according to









I estimate the parameters of the model using Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL).
The likelihood contribution of industry j and country k in period t is deﬁned by one of two
possible outcomes: (1) at least one ﬁrm in the industry chooses to ﬁle one or more petitions
against country k or (2) no ﬁrms in industry j choose to ﬁle a petition against country k.
Deﬁne Fkjt as an indicator variable that equals 1 when industry j ﬁles at least one petition
against country k in period t, Ψ1kjt as the likelihood contribution when industry j fails to ﬁle
an antidumping petition against country k, and Ψ2kjt as the likelihood contribution when
the industry ﬁles one or more petitions. Then conditional on the unobserved country- and



















Recall that Ωkjt is the number of opportunities industry j has to ﬁle an antidumping
petition against country k in period t, and the probability of observing a speciﬁc number
of opportunities is deﬁned by equation [13]. Deﬁne N∗
okjt as the observed number of ﬁrms
participating in opportunity o. Therefore when no petition is ﬁled, the likelihood contribution
is the joint probability that, while Ωkjt opportunities existed, no ﬁrms chose to participate








okjt = 0)f(η)∂η Pr(Ωkjt = b o). (18)
The contribution of an industry that ﬁles at least one petition, Ψ2, includes the probability
of observing the outcome of the petition. More speciﬁcally, it includes the probability of
observing the industry reaching or not reaching a settlement agreement and, conditional on
not reaching a settlement agreement, the probability of observing a particular decision by
the U.S. government. Deﬁne Pkjt as the number of petitions actually ﬁled by industry j
against country k in period t, and Sokjt as an indicator variable that equals 1 when case or



























okjt = 0)]f(η)∂η Pr(Ωkjt = b o). (21)
In brief, when a case is ﬁled by N∗ > 0 ﬁrms, that case may either reach a ﬁnal government
decision as expressed in 19, or be settled prior to reaching the ﬁnal stage of the investigation
as expressed in 20. The ﬁnal line (21) consists of those opportunities in which no ﬁrms chose
to participate, similar to what is captured in equation [18].
In order to calculate the probability of observing N∗ ﬁrms joining a petition, I introduce a
petition-speciﬁc error okjt on the net beneﬁts of participating, where okjt is an iid normally-
distributed error with a standard deviation of σ.17 With the introduction of this error, the
probability that ﬁrm i will participate in an antidumping petition ﬁled by N∗ ﬁrms is deﬁned
as the probability that the expected net beneﬁts of participating are positive, or:
Pr[Ai = 1] = Pr[A
∗
i(N





The probability of observing an N∗ ﬁrm equilibrium is the probability that okjt falls
within a range such that exactly N∗ ﬁrms choose to participate in the petition. If I order
the ﬁrms in the industry from those with the highest to lowest net expected beneﬁts, this is
equivalent to saying that while the N∗th ﬁrm in the market has positive net expected beneﬁts
of participating when N∗ −1 other ﬁrms choose to ﬁle a petition, the (N∗ +1)th ﬁrm would
have negative net expected beneﬁts if it joined the petition given that N∗ other ﬁrms are
participating. Speciﬁcally, this probability is
Pr(N









17 Although I considered using the density of the industry-speciﬁc errors or country-speciﬁc errors to
calculate the probability of industry j ﬁling a petition against country k, the only way to fully account for
the observed data is with an opportunity-speciﬁc error.
16The probability of observing no ﬁrm in the industry choosing to ﬁle a petition is the prob-
ability that okjt falls within a range such that there exists no Pareto dominant equilibrium
in which a positive number of ﬁrms choose to ﬁle a petition:
Pr(N

















The probability that a petition is settled is the probability of observing a combination of
ηokjt and η∗
okjt such that the foreign industry makes an settlement oﬀer acceptable to the do-
mestic industry. Recall that the settlement oﬀer b ηokjt is an increasing function of the foreign
industry’s private information, η∗
okjt. Deﬁne η(η) as the threshold value of η∗
okjt, conditional
on η, such that if η∗
okjt ≥ η(η) then the foreign ﬁrm makes an acceptable settlement oﬀer
to the domestic industry and a settlement agreement is reached. Then the probability of














The integrals in equation [17]cannot be evaluated. I therefore use antithetic acceleration
techniques as described in Geweke [1988] to simulate the values of these integrals. I must
also simulate the number of opportunities to ﬁle, Ω. Simulation is used because the data
does not allow me to distinguish whether the industry did not have an opportunity to ﬁle
an antidumping petition from the case where an opportunity to ﬁle for protection existed,
but no ﬁrm chose to participate in the opportunity. Note that it is important to allow the
number of opportunities to vary across observations. Alternative speciﬁcations in which each
industry has a ﬁxed number of opportunities to ﬁle for antidumping protection would likely
overestimate the free rider problem. Details of the procedure are provided in Appendix A.
For many observations, I simulate the number of ﬁrms eligible to participate in a given
opportunity. While I observe the number of ﬁrms in industry j, not all ﬁrms may be eligible
18A closed form solution to the integral does not exist. Instead, a quadrature formula is employed to
approximate the integral.
17Table 1






Gamma shape parameter 0.654*
(0.080)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate those parameters signiﬁcant at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level.
to participate because petitions are ﬁled against very speciﬁc product categories produced
by country k. These product categories are typically produced by only a subset of ﬁrms
within industry j. When a petition is ﬁled, I observe the number of eligible ﬁrms, but
when an industry chooses not to ﬁle a petition the number of eligible ﬁrms is unobserved. I
simulate the number of eligible ﬁrms by assuming it is a Poisson random variable, where the
mean is a function of the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio in industry j and a gamma-distributed
industry-speciﬁc error. Prior to simulation, I estimate a Poisson model with industry-speciﬁc
random eﬀects using the number of ﬁrms eligible to participate in petitions actually ﬁled.
The results are presented in Table [1]. I then use these coeﬃcients to simulate the number
of ﬁrms eligible to participate in a given opportunity from a Poisson distribution with the
mean indicated for industry j.
The net beneﬁt of participating in a petition (A∗) is a function of the expected value
of the settlement oﬀer (b η) and the derivative of the expected settlement oﬀer conditional
on reaching a settlement agreement. Recall that η is deﬁned as the threshold value of η∗
such that the domestic industry will accept the foreign industry’s oﬀer and a settlement
agreement will be reached. Then the conditional expected value of the settlement oﬀer and
the change in the settlement oﬀer with respect to the number of participating ﬁrms can be













Closed form solutions do not exist to either the expected settlement oﬀer or the derivative
of the expected settlement oﬀer. I therefore calculate these expected values using a variant
of Simpson’s Rule to approximate the indeﬁnite integrals.19
5 Results
The parameters associated with the opportunity to apply for protection are given in
Table [2]. In each table, the (asymptotic) standard errors are given in parentheses. The
average number of opportunities an industry has to ﬁle against a speciﬁc country in a given
year is 0.55, with a standard deviation of 0.86. The number of opportunities is higher for more
developed, faster growing countries and for those countries that are more important sources
of U.S. imports. These results are consistent with the characteristics of the leading targets
of antidumping petitions, such as Japan, China, and the countries of the European Union.
The number of opportunities increases with a depreciation of a country’s currency relative
to the dollar.20 Intuitively, exchange rate depreciation results in a fall in import prices; the
fall in prices gives U.S. industries the opportunity to ﬁle more antidumping petitions.21
The parameters associated with the level of protection awarded by the government are
given in Table [3]. U.S. antidumping statutes direct government agencies to consider the
growth in domestic shipments, the growth in the domestic capacity utilization rate, and the
market share of the country under investigation, among other factors, in deciding whether
19The method deviates from Simpson’s Rule in that I must deﬁne a value for inﬁnity in order to calculate
the value of the approximation. This should result in a close enough approximation as long as “inﬁnity”
is suﬃciently large. Throughout the course of the estimation procedure, I deﬁne inﬁnity as six-times the
standard deviation of η∗.
20I calculate the growth of the exchange rate using the dollars per unit of foreign currency exchange rate.
Thus, a positive growth rate actually represents a depreciation of the currency relative to the dollar.
21Knetter and Prusa [2003] also ﬁnd strong positive impact of currency depreciation on the number of
antidumping petitions ﬁled.
19Table 2




Growth in GNP 0.645*
(0.149)
GNP per capita (in thousands of dollars) 0.015*
(0.001)
Growth in exchange rate -0.051*
(0.014)
Total imports (in billions of dollars) 0.022*
(0.001)
θ : Gamma shape parameter 0.983*
(0.041)
Ω: mean number of opportunities 0.551
σ2
Ω: variance of the number of opportunities 0.859
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate those parameters signiﬁcant at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level.
20the domestic industry has been injured by unfair imports. However, only the market share
of the targeted country proves to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the value of the antidumping
tariﬀ.22
The estimates reveal that Chinese industries face higher antidumping tariﬀs than indus-
tries in other countries. This could represent either a bias in antidumping regulations or
more actual dumping on the part of Chinese ﬁrms. On average, petitions ﬁled against Chi-
nese industries result in antidumping tariﬀs approximately 19.1 percent higher than those
ﬁled against other countries.
The degree of political inﬂuence on the outcomes of antidumping petitions has been
widely studied, with mixed results. For example, Finger, Hall and Nelson [1982] found no
evidence of political inﬂuence on the size of the antidumping tariﬀs but some evidence that
the size of the industry can inﬂuence whether protection is awarded at all. While Moore
[1992] found evidence that the size of the industry has a positive inﬂuence on whether
protection is awarded, Hansen and Prusa [1996, 1997] found no evidence that either the size
or the concentration of the industry eﬀected outcomes. In contrast, I ﬁnd evidence that
political factors have an impact on the level of protection. The expected antidumping tariﬀ
increases with the size of the industry, as measured by domestic employment.
The proportion of ﬁrms participating in the case has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
level of protection, albeit with a diminishing rate of return. On average, when the percentage
of ﬁrms participating in a petition rises from 25 to 50 percent, the expected antidumping
tariﬀ increases by 5.9 percent. When the participation rate increases from 50 percent to 100
percent, the additional boost in the tariﬀ is 3.7 percent. This result shows that there is a
real private beneﬁt to participating in this rent seeking activity, which diminishes the free
rider problem.
Parameter estimates associated with the domestic industry’s beneﬁts and foreign in-
dustry’s costs due to the imposition of an antidumping tariﬀ are presented in Table [4].23
Column 2 of Table [4] presents the parameters associated with domestic beneﬁts and column
22The results are consistent with Hansen and Prusa [1996] and [1997].
23Data limitations prevent me from separately identifying ﬁrm-speciﬁc errors for both costs and beneﬁts.
The speciﬁcation presented here arbitrarily ﬁxes the standard deviation such that exp(σξ) equals 2.0, or σξ
equals 7.4.
21Table 3
Parameter Estimates: Expected Antidumping Tariﬀ
Variable
Growth in domestic shipments -0.207
(0.207)
Growth in capacity utilization rate -0.093
(0.184)
Market share of country under investigation 3.538*
(0.419)
Domestic employment (in 1,000s) 0.001*
(0.0002)
Four-ﬁrm concentration ratio 0.116
(0.089)
Country is China 0.535*
(0.076)




µω : Mean -0.563*
(0.044)
σω : Standard deviation 0.738*
(0.026)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate those parameters signiﬁcant at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level.
223 presents the those associated with the foreign industry’s costs.
Most of the parameter estimates associated with the beneﬁts accruing to the domestic
industry and costs accruing to the foreign industry due to the imposition of a tariﬀ are
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level and have a reasonable economic interpretation. The
parameter estimates suggest that domestic ﬁrms within high-growth industries have larger
gains from a tariﬀ which restricts the level of imports than ﬁrms in low-growth industries.
The foreign industry is hurt more when the tariﬀ is imposed upon larger, faster growing
industries.24 Results also suggest that domestic industry beneﬁts increase with the total
value of imports and the average mark-up.
Further analysis of the parameters in Table [4] show that the most important determinant
in a domestic industry’s ability to reach a settlement agreement with their foreign competitors
is the level of asymmetric information. A one standard deviation increase in the amount of
private information held by the domestic industry (η) decreases the probability of reaching a
settlement agreement by 56.9 percent. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions in
Panagariya and Gupta [1998]. However, other characteristics of the industry also eﬀect the
likelihood of a settlement agreement. Most signiﬁcantly, for each million dollar increase in
the size of the domestic market, the probability of reaching a settlement agreement increases
by one percentage point. The domestic industry is slightly less likely to reach a settlement
agreement the higher the expected level of protection; a one percentage point increase in the
expected antidumping tariﬀ results in a 0.3 percentage point decrease in the probability of
reaching a settlement agreement.
Parameters associated with the cost of ﬁling for protection are presented in Table [5].
The conventional wisdom since Olson’s [1965] seminal work on collective actions has been
that the free rider problem becomes more severe as the number of the ﬁrms in the industry
rises. However, more recent models of collective actions result in slightly diﬀerent predictions
about industry structure and the ability to overcome the free rider problem. For example,
Pecorino [1998] ﬁnds that the number of ﬁrms in the industry will not necessarily change its
24Recall that I specify the foreign industry’s change in beneﬁts as B∗
1 = −τ∗ exp(XB) to ensure that the
foreign industry experiences a loss when a dumping margin is imposed. Therefore, a positive parameter esti-
mate indicates that the loss suﬀered by the foreign industry increases with the variable under consideration.
23Table 4
Parameter Estimates: Beneﬁts of Filing a Petition
Variable Domestic Foreign
Imports from target country (in millions of dollars) 9.56x10−9 -0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
Growth in imports from target country 0.164*
(0.043)
Domestic market size (in millions of dollars) -9.294* 0.845*
(4.646) (0.042)




Total imports (in millions of dollars) 0.004*
(0.002)




ση: Domestic-opportunity error standard deviation 47.419*
(6.457)
ση∗:Foreign-opportunity error standard deviation 4.387*
(2.008)
σ: Opportunity error standard deviation 69.962*
(15.334)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate those parameters signiﬁcant at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level.
24ability to maintain cooperation and engage in lobbying. However, Magee [2002] concludes
that an increase in the number of ﬁrms makes the free rider problem more severe as long as
the number of ﬁrms in the industry is suﬃciently large. The parameter estimates support
the conventional wisdom that per ﬁrm costs, and thus the ability to overcome the free
rider problem, increase with the number of ﬁrms in the industry. However, the parameter
estimates also indicate that holding the number of ﬁrms in the industry constant, the free
rider problem becomes more severe the greater the level of concentration in the industry.
This suggests that the free rider problem is at its worst for perfectly competitive industries
and oligopolies with a few strong competitors.
Surprisingly, the estimates reveal that per ﬁrm costs actually increase slightly when ad-
ditional ﬁrms participate, albeit at a diminishing rate. On average, the inclusion of one
additional ﬁrm in a petition increases the ﬁrm’s average cost of participating in the peti-
tion by 0.6 percent.25 This increase may be associated with increased coordination costs.
Nevertheless, ﬁrms within industries ﬁling petitions ﬁnd that the marginal beneﬁt gained
from joining the petition and gaining a higher level of protection exceeds the additional costs
associated with its participation.
5.1 Speciﬁcation Tests
To see how well the model ﬁts the data, I conduct a series of chi-square goodness of
ﬁt tests.26 The results from these tests indicate that the model predicts the industry’s
decision to ﬁle and settle a petition, as well as the government’s decision regarding the level
of protection, quite accurately.
25Per ﬁrm costs are maximized when the number of ﬁrms participating reach 217. Because 98 percent
of all petitions are ﬁled by fewer than 100 ﬁrms, it is reasonable to conclude that costs increase with the
number of participating ﬁrms.
26In general, for each outcome of the model I want to test, I divide the outcome into N mutually exclusive
and exhaustive events. For example, to test how well the model predicts the industry’s decision to ﬁle a
petition, I divide the outcome variable into two mutually exclusive events (ﬁle and not ﬁle). Test statistics
are calculated for each event by ﬁrst dividing the probability of observation i choosing event n into quintiles.
The test statistic compares the actual number of observations to choose event n within the quintile with the
predicted number, and has a χ2 distribution with four degrees of freedom.
25Table 5




Four-ﬁrm Concentration Ratio 38.827*
(11.088)
Number of Firms in Industry 0.012*
(0.003)
Concentration Ratio * Firms 8.629x10−8
(0.006)
Number of Firms Participating 1.314*
(0.312)
Number of Firms Participating2 -0.003
(0.003)
σν: Country-speciﬁc error standard deviation 25.508*
(5.649)
σξ: Firms-speciﬁc error standard deviation 16.650*
(3.844)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate those parameters signiﬁcant at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level.
26Table 6
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test:Proportion of Firms Filing Petition
Proportion Range Actual Number Predicted Number χ2 Statistic
N∗
Firms =0.00 452,418 452,223 0.21
0.00< N∗
Firms ≤0.25 226 346 63.82
0.25< N∗
Firms ≤0.50 189 175 16.82
0.50< N∗
Firms ≤0.75 57 68 32.42
0.75< N∗
Firms ≤1.00 107 159 25.81
I ﬁrst test how well the model predicts the industry’s decision to ﬁle a petition.27 The
model over predicts the number of observations choosing to ﬁle a petition during the sample
period. Between 1980 and 1996, only 544, or 0.12 percent, of the observations ﬁled at least
one petition where an observation is an industry, country, year combination. In contrast
the model predicts that 747 observations, or 0.17 percent of the sample, ﬁled at least one
petition during this time period. I statistically reject the null hypothesis that the model
correctly predicts the decision to ﬁle a petition.28
To further investigate this decision, I next conduct tests to study how well the model
predicts the proportion of ﬁrms ﬁling a petition. Although I statistically reject the null
hypothesis that the model predicts the same proportion of ﬁrms ﬁling a petition as observed
in the data for all ranges but the decision not to ﬁle, in general the model is better able to
match petitions ﬁled by more than 25 percent of the industry than those ﬁled by a smaller
proportion.
I next test how well the model predicts the outcome of antidumping petitions ﬁled in the
United States. As noted above, between 1980 and 1996 approximately 20.0 percent of all
petitions were settled prior to reaching a ﬁnal government decision. Of those petitions not
27To avoid needless complications associated with single observations ﬁling multiple petitions, I deﬁne my
“event” as the decision of the industry to ﬁle at least one petition against country k in period t. The proba-
bility of the industry choosing not to ﬁle a petition is the probability that either one or more opportunities
existed and no ﬁrms chose to partake in those opportunities or no opportunities existed.
28In contrast, the test statistic associated with the decision not to ﬁle a petition is 0.31, therefore I fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the model correctly predicts the decision not to ﬁle a petition.
27Table 7
Chi-Square Goodness of Fit Test: Tariﬀ Rate
Tariﬀ Range χ2 Statistic
τ∗ = 0.00 13.76
0.00< τ∗ ≤0.20 60.32
0.20< τ∗ ≤0.40 2.60
0.40< τ∗ ≤0.60 6.62
0.60< τ∗ ≤0.80 5.03
τ∗ ≥0.80 23.88
settled, slightly over half were successful during the sample period. In contrast, the model
predicts a slightly lower settlement rate of 17.4 percent of the petitions actually ﬁled and
success rate for the rest of the petitions of 47.9 percent. I fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the model predicts a settlement agreement between the foreign and domestic industries
and the null hypothesis that the model accurately predicts the success of the remaining
petitions.
The results from a chi-square goodness-of-ﬁt test for the level of protection awarded by
the government, or τ∗, are included in Table [7].29 In general, the test statistics indicate that
the model is able to predict tariﬀs between 20 and 80 percent much more accurately than
those under 20 percent or above 80 percent.
5.2 Counterfactual Experiments
One of the primary beneﬁts of estimating a structural model of this nature is that the
parameter estimates are invariant to policy changes and thus can be used to conduct coun-
terfactual policy experiments. This section discusses the results of two such experiments
designed to alter an industry’s ability to overcome the free rider problem. The ﬁrst coun-
terfactual experiment increases the per ﬁrm cost of ﬁling a petition by 10 percent, while the
29The test is similar to those used to test other aspects of the model in that I ﬁrst divide the expected
level of protection into n discrete ranges.
28second increases the beneﬁts to ﬁrms that participate in a successful petition by 10 percent.30
In the discussion below, I compare the outcome of the counterfactual experiment with the
outcome of a baseline simulation of the model. Outcomes of interest include the number of
ﬁrms participating in each petition, as well as the outcome of the petition.
When the average per ﬁrm cost of ﬁling a petition increases by 10 percent the number of
petitions ﬁled falls dramatically by 49.1 percent. The average number of ﬁrms participating
in each petition also decreases slightly to 3.7, or 38.8 percent of all ﬁrms in the industry. As
the private costs of joining the petition increase fewer ﬁrms are willing to invest in the rent-
seeking activity and the free rider problem is exacerbated. The distribution of case outcomes
does not change signiﬁcantly when the cost of ﬁling a petition increases. For example, it
continues to be the case that slightly over half of those petitions not settled out of court are
successful. It is true that when the costs of ﬁling a petition are higher, only those petitions
with higher returns will be ﬁled. The results from the simulation, therefore, suggest that
there are often signiﬁcant returns to ﬁling a petition even when it is unsuccessful.31
The second experiment rewards ﬁrms that participate in successful antidumping petitions
with additional private beneﬁts. The experiment is intended to mimic a change in U.S.
antidumping law that was passed in 2000 known as the “Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Oﬀset Act,” or the “Byrd Amendment,” which requires the government to distribute the
tariﬀ revenue collected due to successful antidumping petitions to the ﬁrms that supported
these petitions.32 Critics of the law charge that it will increase the number of antidumping
petitions ﬁled in the United States.33
The results of the experiment conﬁrm the accuracy of this criticism. When the private
beneﬁts to those ﬁrms participating in a successful antidumping petition are increased by
30In each experiment, I use the structural parameter estimates and draws of the model’s errors to simulate
the number of ﬁrms choosing to participate in each opportunity; if the industry chooses to ﬁle a petition, I
also simulate the outcome of the petition. Choices are simulated for six draws of the error terms.
31This result mirrors the results from other studies of the “investigation eﬀects” of petitions. For example,
Staiger and Wolak [1994] ﬁnd that antidumping petitions reduce the ﬂow of imports during the period of
investigation by half of the reduction that would be expected if the petition is successful.
32In September 2002, the World Trade Organization ruled that the law violates the international agreement
on subsidies. However, the United States has yet to repeal the law.
33Elizabeth Olson, “U.S. Law on Trade Fines is Challenged Overseas,” New York Times, July 14, 2001.
2910 percent, the number of petitions ﬁled over the sample period increases by 9.3 percent.
Moreover, more ﬁrms choose to actively participate in these petitions; the average proportion
of eligible ﬁrms ﬁling antidumping petitions increases by 1.6 percentage points under the
counterfactual experiment. On the whole these petitions are more successful, suggesting
that not only will more petitions be ﬁled but the total level of antidumping protection will
rise when the private beneﬁts of participating are increased. Under the experiment, the
percentage of cases settled out of court falls by 1.4 points because ﬁrms only receive the
additional private beneﬁts if the government imposes a tariﬀ. Of the remaining petitions,
however, the percentage of successful cases increases by 5.3 percentage points and the average
antidumping tariﬀ increases by 12.1 percent from the baseline model. Because ﬁrms are only
awarded additional private beneﬁts when a petition is successful, and these beneﬁts increase
with the tariﬀ, the policy change increases the number of successful petitions ﬁled by ﬁrms
but the number of unsuccessful petitions remains the same. In total, the number of successful
petitions ﬁled by ﬁrms increases by 30.3 percent from the baseline model.
6 Conclusion
This research develops and estimates a model of a ﬁrm’s decision to engage in the rent-
seeking activity of ﬁling an antidumping petition. The model hypothesizes that industries
are able to overcome the free rider problem associated with lobbying for trade protection
because ﬁrms who choose to actively lobby will receive private beneﬁts in the form of an
increase in the level of protection. The parameter estimates support this hypothesis. The
results also support predictions that industries characterized by either high concentration
levels or large numbers of ﬁrms are less likely to overcome the free rider problem.
The results from the model conﬁrm theoretical predictions about the distribution of
trade protection in an economy. For example, parameter estimates indicate that the level
of antidumping protection provided by the government is a function of both economic and
political factors, as suggested by the theoretical research on the political economy of trade
policy and bureaucratic decision-making. The parameter estimates also conﬁrm that the
larger the amount of private-information held by the domestic and foreign industries, the less-
30likely these parties will be able to reach a welfare-enhancing negotiated settlement following
the initiation of an antidumping investigation.
Policy experiments suggest that even small changes in antidumping law can dramatically
change the number of antidumping petitions ﬁled each year. For example, a 10 percent
increase in the cost of ﬁling a petition results in a nearly 50 percent decrease in the number
of petitions ﬁled. In contrast, increasing the private beneﬁts of participating in a successful
petition by only 10 percent increases the number of successful antidumping petitions ﬁled by
industries by slightly over 30 percent. In general, the results indicate that the level of trade
protection in an economy is strongly inﬂuenced by policies that help or hinder industries
overcome the free rider problem.
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33A Simulation Details
The model described in Section 2 makes a distinction between situations in which the
industry has no opportunity to ﬁle against country k and situations in which an opportunity
to ﬁle exists but no ﬁrms choose to actively participate in the petition. Unfortunately,
I cannot distinguish between these two events in the data. Because I do not observe the
number of antidumping petitions each industry has the opportunity to ﬁle against country
k in period t, I need to simulate this number of opportunities. The simulator must be
constructed in such a way that it guarantees that the number of opportunities each industry
has to ﬁle exceeds the number of petitions actually ﬁled by the industry in period t.
Allowing the number of opportunities to vary as I update my parameter values causes
discontinuities in the likelihood function. In order to ensure that the estimation procedure
is continuous in the parameter space, I keep the number of opportunities to ﬁle constant
throughout the estimation procedure. As I update my parameter values, the term in the
likelihood function that incorporates the probability of observing a particular number of
opportunities is smoothed in the parameter space using the probability of observing those
opportunities based on the initial parameter choice.
Deﬁne Pkjt as the number of petitions actually ﬁled by industry j against country k.
Consider the following algorithm34:
1. Choose an initial value of the parameters, θo.
2. For each industry/country combination, draw a random variable ζR
0 from a Gamma
(θF
o ) distribution, and calculate the rate at which opportunities arise λkjt = exp[XFkjtβF+
lnζR
o ].
3. For each industry, country and year combination, draw a random variable (oo
kjt) from
a Poisson(λkj) distribution, conditional on the fact that oo
kjt ≥ Pkjt. Deﬁne oo
kjt as the
number of opportunities industry j has to ﬁle against country k in period t.
34This algorithm uses the multiplication method to draw random variables from a Poisson distribution.
The multiplication method has been shown to be a preferred simulation method when λkjt varies for each
observation.
34As noted above, I keep the number of opportunities (oo
kjt) constant throughout my esti-
mation procedure. As the parameter values, θ, are updated, I calculate the probability of
observing oo
kjt opportunities based on the new parameter values, and smooth this probability
in the parameter space using the probability of observing oo
kjt based on the initial parameter






This algorithm can be interpreted as an importance sampling simulator by rewriting the
probability of observing a particular number of opportunities as:
Pr(Ωkjt = o |θ) =
Pr(Ωkjt = o|θ)
Pr(Ωkjt = o|θo)
Pr(Ωkjt = o|θo)
35